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Abstract
The empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed.
The problem in assessing the extent of adverse selection is that private infor-
mation, on which agents act, is generally unobservable to the researcher, which
makes it di¢ cult to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard.
Unique micro data, from a dental insurance natural experiment, is here used
to provide a direct test of selection. All agents in a population were strati￿ed
into di⁄erent risk classes, and were unexpectedly given the opportunity to insure
their dental care costs. The setup of the insurance makes it possible to observe
a proxy for private information. Interestingly, results di⁄er across risk classes.
Within high-risk classes, there is evidence of adverse selection and within low-
risk classes, the results, surprisingly, indicate an advantageous selection. This
dual selection can explain the limited empirical evidence for adverse selection
in insurance markets in the literature: the two e⁄ects may balance out on the
aggregate level. The paper also presents a model of insurance choice that can
harbor both adverse and advantageous selection. The pattern in the data is ex-
plained by di⁄erences in the e⁄ectiveness of prevention across high and low risk
classes.
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Economists typically regard insurance markets to be inhibited by asymmetric informa-
tion when the insured part is better informed about risks than the insurer. Akerlof
(1970) showed that asymmetric information is a potent source of market failure. High
risks may drive out low risks, resulting in an adverse selection death spiral. Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976), in turn, pointed out that markets can mitigate this type of
asymmetric information, but at the price of low risks being under-insured.
Adverse selection in insurance markets has been given considerable theoretical at-
tention. The question is, however, how large the problem is in practice; that is, do
people have private information on risk and do they act on it? The empirical evidence
of adverse selection as a source of market failure in insurance markets is still limited,
see Chiappori and SalaniØ (2003). In part, this is due to problems measuring private
information available to the policy holder, but not to the insurer, making it di¢ cult to
distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard in the analysis. An observed relation
between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures need not be the result
of adverse selection, but might just as well be due the higher demand for services, that
follows with more extensive coverage. To separate adverse selection from moral hazard,
health risks need to be exogenous to insurance status. Apart from the methodolog-
ical problems, the lack of clear evidence in the literature is also due to inconclusive
empirical results; this is also true for markets where health risks are insured.1
This study provides a direct test of selection using unique data from a dental insur-
ance natural experiment. In 1999, the National Dental Service in V￿rmland, Sweden,
gave a population of dental patients the possibility to sign a full-coverage dental insur-
ance. Prior to 1999, no voluntary dental insurance was available to this population,
and the introduction of the insurance scheme was unexpected from the patients￿per-
spective. Dental health was therefore exogenous to the introduction of the insurance,
1For example, Cutler and Reber (1998), Thomasson (2002), Finkelstein and Poterba (2002), and
Godfried, Oosterbeek and Tulder (2001) ￿nd evidence of adverse selection, while Cameron and Trivedi
(1991), Cawley and Philipson (1999), Cardon and Hendel (2001), Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002),
Finkelstein and McGarry (2003), and Pauly et al. (2003) do not ￿nd any, or only limited, evidence of
adverse selection.
1constituting a natural experiment. The setup of the insurance and the recurrent char-
acteristic of dental problems make it possible to observe a proxy for private information.
Interestingly, the results di⁄er across risk classes and there is direct evidence of both
adverse and advantageous selection, the latter implying that agents with low risk are
more inclined to buy insurance. Some evidence consistent with advantageous selection
is also found by Finkelstein and McGarry (2003) and Cawley and Philipson (1999).
The lack of conclusive empirical evidence in the literature has led to arguments for
why adverse selection may not be a major problem in insurance markets. de Meza and
Webb (2001) model a situation where the propensity to take precaution increases with
the degree of risk aversion, resulting in low risks buying extensive coverage, albeit at
an actuarially unfair premium, while high risks go under-insured, i.e. advantageous
selection. Their analysis is, here, extended by letting the e⁄ectiveness of prevention
vary. The theoretical model presented in this paper is cast in a setting that mimics
the dental insurance in V￿rmland, and can simultaneously harbor both adverse and
advantageous selection; that is, advantageous selection in low risk classes and adverse
selection in high risk classes, just as observed in the data.
This dual selection observed in the data, and captured by the model, may explain
the limited empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets, as the two
e⁄ects balance out on the aggregate level. The next section describes the voluntary
dental insurance in V￿rmland, and the setting where it is cast. Section three presents
a theoretical framework of the decision to purchase insurance. Data, econometric
framework, and estimations are presented in section four. In the ￿nal section, the
results are discussed and related to the theoretical framework.
2 A dental insurance natural experiment
Dental care in Sweden is covered by a public dental insurance, providing coverage
from the year a patient turns 20.2 Dental care is provided both by private, mainly
self-employed, dentists and by the National Dental Service. Both private and public
dentists are a¢ liated to the public dental insurance. Within the National Dental
2Up to the age of 19, patients are provided with free dental services.
2Service, dentists are employed with a ￿xed salary, and have therefore no direct private
economic gain from increasing revenues or reducing cost.
The public dental insurance was originally designed as a progressive subsidy, where
the level of the subsidy was increasing with higher treatment costs. Over time, both
the progressiveness and the level of subsidy has gradually been reduced. In 1999, the
public dental insurance was reformed, and a linear subsidy providing a coverage of 30
percent was introduced (Olsson, 1999). So, individuals have, over time, become more
exposed to the risk of high dental care costs.
In order to reduce this risk exposure, the National Dental Service in the county of
V￿rmland, Sweden, introduced a voluntary private dental insurance in January 1999,
supplementing the public insurance. All their patients were o⁄ered to subscribe to
dental care; that is, at a ￿xed annual fee, a subscription contract provides free dental
services during a two-year contract period. The dental care subscription is, in e⁄ect, a
full-coverage voluntary dental insurance provided by a public monopolist.
An interesting feature with this insurance is that it was o⁄ered to a whole popula-
tion of patients, who previously had not been able to buy a supplementary insurance.
Dental health, at the time the insurance was launched, would therefore be exogenous
to the insurance choice. The potential for moral hazard in anticipation of the insur-
ance was negligible, as the introduction was unexpected from the patients￿perspective:
it only reached the general public from August 1998. Moreover, o¢ cials at the Na-
tional Dental Service in V￿rmland state that the option of voluntary insurance was
mainly brought to patients￿attention by their dentist after January 1st 1999, and the
possibility of moral hazard, ex-ante, is even further reduced by the fact that agents
did not know their would-be premium before January 1999. With dental health being
exogenous to the insurance choice, the introduction of the voluntary dental insurance
constitutes a natural experiment, and any systematic di⁄erence between purchasers
and non-purchasers would be due to selection.
The price of a subscription contract is based on the patient￿ s dental risk and is set
after an oral examination of the patient. The oral examination evaluates dental risk
in four dimensions (general risk, technical risk, caries risk, and parodental risk) and
for each dimension there are 6 to 8 risk indicators, where each indicator is rated on a
3four-graded scale. Based on the sum of these scores, patients are clustered into one of
16 risk classes. Contracts are priced according to risk class, with the annual prices in
1999 ranging from 295 SEK (32 EURO) for the lowest risk class to 11 000 SEK (1 200
EURO) for the highest. The dental service in V￿rmland only uses these risk indicators
when assessing risk, and does not take explicit account of realized dental costs.
Risk classes are also used by the dental service in V￿rmland to assess the dental
status of the population.3 Roughly 60 percent of all registered patients had a valid risk
classi￿cation in 1999, and where thus o⁄ered to purchase insurance. Around 23 percent
of these patients, 6 888 individuals, bought a dental subscription in 1999. Within each
risk class, it is therefore possible to compare individuals purchasing insurance, with
those who did not. Note also that dentists within the National Dental Service do not
have any direct private economic interest in the insurance, as they are employed with
a ￿xed salary.
The main dental problem, caries, can be characterized as a life-long infectious dis-
ease. Caries arises when bacteria on the teeth produce acid, gradually dissolving the
enamel on the surface of the teeth. Eventually, this may result in a cavity; that is,
the bacteria will penetrate the tooth and make the pulp in￿ amed. Every time we eat
something, the harmful acid is produced and will be active for around half an hour.
Caries is a relatively slow process and with preventive activities, it can be stopped or
even reversed at an early stage, e.g. with tooth brushing, dental ￿ ossing and ￿ uoride
rinsing.
If a person has a history of prior caries, he has a higher probability of getting new
problems. Bacteria will easily grow if the enamel has been coarsened by prior caries, or
grow in the seam between a prior ￿lling and the tooth. Further, a ￿lled tooth will need
future maintenance or replacement, and is also more fragile. Consequently, dental care
utilization has been observed to have a high correlation over time (see, for example,
Powell 1998). Past dental consumption would therefore be a good measure of dental
care risk and future dental care consumption.
If agents have private information about their dental risk, this could be proxied
3The ambition is that all patients should be classi￿ed, but this is a slow process as patients come
for check-up visits annually or every second year.
4with past dental care consumption, since the National Dental Service in V￿rmland
does not explicitly use past dental care utilization in their risk assessment. Now, even
if patients are clustered into 16 risk classes, there is still heterogeneity among patients
within each risk class, and since prior use of dental care is a predictor of future use,
it would capture the intra-group variation in risk. More speci￿cally, dental costs 1996
to 1998 are used as a proxy for private information, i.e. utilization the three years
preceding the insurance. Hence, the impact of asymmetric information in the decision
to purchase insurance can be directly observed.
An important question at this stage is whether past dental consumption contains
any private information on dental risk. It would be natural to think that the oral
examinations would exhaust all information contained in past utilization. To this end,
the validity of past dental costs, as a proxy for private information, is assessed by
regressing dental costs during the three years 1999 to 2001 on dummy variables for
each of the 16 risk classes and on dental costs during the three preceding years, i.e.
1996 to 1998. If the proxy does contain private information, past dental costs should
explain future costs in excess of the risk classi￿cation.4
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 reports that past dental costs, 1996 to 1998, alone explain 12 percent of
the variation in future costs, whereas the risk classi￿cation system alone explains 17
percent. The risk classes are better predictors of future dental costs, and contain more
information on dental risk, than do past costs. When both past dental costs and risk
classes are used as regressors, 21 percent of the variation in costs 1999 to 2001 are
explained. Hence, a large part, but not all, of the information contained in past dental
consumption is also captured by the risk classi￿cation system. There is still scope
for private information to act on. Past dental consumption captures an additional 20
percent (3.5 percentage points) of the variation in future dental costs not captured by
the risk classi￿cation system.
4The validity test is conducted on the group of patients who did not purchase insurance during the
period 1996 to 2001, 36 241 individuals. The reason for only using non-policyholders is that dental care
within the insurance may be in￿ uenced by clinical guidelines related to speci￿c risk classes, generating
a spurious relation.
53 A model of dental insurance choice
A standard asymmetric information argument would state that high-risk individuals
are more inclined to purchase insurance, but this need not be true if agents di⁄er in
risk aversion and there is a positive correlation between risk aversion and preventive
activities. In this section, insurance choice is analyzed in a model with asymmetric
information, accounting not only for di⁄erences in risk aversion but also the character-
istics of the dental insurance launched in V￿rmland. The set-up is close to de Meza
and Webb (2001), but extended by letting the e⁄ectiveness of prevention to vary.
3.1 Prevention and risk aversion
It is easy to ￿nd anecdotal evidence consistent with low-risk individuals being more
likely to purchase insurance. Hemenway (1990), for example, reports that people with
a motor vehicle liability coverage are less likely than others to drink-and-drive, and
that members of the American Automobile Association, with on-site car service assis-
tance, have better cars than the average American. Apart from anecdotal evidence,
the hypothesis of a positive relation between risk aversion and health precaution is
empirically supported by Barsky, Justin, Kimball and Shapiro (1997). From a psy-
chological perspective, the relation between risk aversion and precaution could be due
to concordance in agents￿underlying preferences, i.e. that some agents are generally
averse to risks in life, ￿nancial as well as other risks, as argued by Keinan, Meir and
Gome-Nemirovsky (1984). However, there is no unambiguous evidence of risk-taking
being an overall personality trait; for example, Slovic (1972) argues that the ￿major-
ity of evidence argues against the existence of risk-taking propensity as a generalized
characteristic of individuals￿ .
Without the argument of risk-taking being a personality trait, the relation be-
tween risk aversion and precaution would be the result of equilibrium behavior in a
risky world, as analyzed by Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985), and Briys and Schlesinger
(1990). The general conclusion is that precautionary activity that reduces the poten-
tial loss in a bad state, self-insurance, is enhanced by risk aversion. For self-protection,
precautionary activity reducing the probability of the bad state, the relation is not as
6clear cut. A higher risk aversion does not necessarily imply more self-protection.
In a dental context, precautionary activities can mainly be seen as self-protection;
that is, prevention reduces the probability of caries by reducing the likelihood of bac-
teria penetrating the enamel of a tooth. Once this has occurred, preventive activities
do not a⁄ect the progress of the cavity.5 Still, a higher risk aversion will result in more
dental prevention. Suppose that agents have a utility function U(W;F), where they
obtain utility from general consumption, W, and disutility from precautionary activi-
ties, F. Self-prevention is assumed not to enter the agents￿budget constraint, as it has
a negligible monetary e⁄ect on general consumption in a dental context. Instead, the
disutility of prevention enters directly as a separate argument in the utility function.
The disutility comes from the unpleasantness of preventive activities, for instance it
hurts to ￿ oss, or that preventive activities may crowd-out more pleasant activities. A
second assumption is that the marginal disutility of prevention is una⁄ected by the
level of income, U00
12 = 0. This would imply that prevention like dental ￿ ossing is
equally painful regardless of income. Under these two assumptions, agents with higher
risk aversion unequivocally perform more self-protection.6
To see this e⁄ect, assume that agents face a ￿nancial loss L with probability 1￿P.
The probability is not predetermined, but can be reduced if agents make a precaution-
ary e⁄ort; that is, P = P(F), where P 0(F) > 0 and P 00(F) < 0. The loss is viewed as
a pure ￿nancial cost. In the case of a health risk, the loss can be seen as the cost of
treatment necessary to regain health, or as the repairing cost necessary to restore teeth
to be ￿t for use. Agents are also assumed to have constant relative risk aversion, i.e.
higher wealth reduces the degree of risk aversion. By letting U(:) be a CRRA function,
risk aversion can be modelled with an individual-speci￿c taste-parameter, ￿i. This pa-
rameter is added to the wealth component of the utility function, U(￿i + W;Fi), so
5The distinction between self-insurance and self-protection is not razor-sharp, as dental prevention
naturally has some self-insurance as well. For example, by reducing the extent of potential tooth
loosening, the loss in the bad state is reduced.
6With some restrictions on how prevention a⁄ects the marginal utility of income, the result would
still hold in a more general formulation, see Appendix A.1. Moreover, Dachraoui, Dionne, Eeckhoudt
and Godfroid (2003) shows for a general class of utility functions, mixed risk aversion, that even if
prevention has a monetary cost, a higher risk aversion does increase the level of self-protection given
that the probability of loss is less than one-half.
7with a higher ￿i, the agent behaves as if he were wealthier. Hence, a higher ￿i implies
a lower level of risk aversion.
The expected utility for the agent becomes
EUi = P(Fi)U(￿i + W;Fi) + (1 ￿ P(Fi))U(￿i + W ￿ L;Fi): (1)
Prevention raises the expected utility as it increases the probability of the healthy
state, but comes at a cost as prevention induces disutility. From the assumption of
marginal disutility of prevention being una⁄ected by income, U00
12 = 0, there exists an
interior maximum optimizing the level of prevention.7. By di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order
condition with respect to Fi and ￿i, the marginal e⁄ect of risk aversion on precautionary





1(￿i + W;Fi) ￿ U0
1(￿i + W ￿ L;Fi)]
S:O:C:
< 0: (2)
This e⁄ect is negative, which implies that precautionary e⁄ort, F, will increase with the
degree of risk aversion. Hence, in equilibrium, prevention is a function of risk aversion,
Fi = F(￿i), and more risk averse agents have a higher probability of ending up in the
good state than have less risk averse agents.
3.2 Who purchases insurance
Suppose that a voluntary full-coverage insurance is introduced, giving agents the op-
portunity to avoid risk exposure and smooth out consumption. An agent￿ s risk level
is determined by his prior prevention. A problem, however, is that the insurer cannot
distinguish between high-risk and low-risk agents, so the premium will be based on the
average probability ￿ =
P
nkPk, where nk is the number of agents with probability
Pk in the population. An actuarially fair full-coverage insurance would give the agent
an assured wealth level Z = ￿W + (1 ￿ ￿)(W ￿ L) in both states, which will yield
him a utility level of U(￿i +Z;0). Note that the second argument is 0, since the agent
will not perform any precautionary activity once he is fully insured.
7There can still be an optimal level of prevention if the disutility of prevention increases with the
level income or if prevention has a monetary cost, see Appendix A.1.
8The certainty equivalence￿ the certain income level that takes the agent to the
same utility level as in the risky world￿ is de￿ned as
U(￿i + C(L;￿i;Pi);0) (3)
= U(￿i + ~ C(L;￿i;Pi);F(￿i))
= P(￿i)U(￿i + W;F(￿i)) + [1 ￿ P(￿i)]U(￿i + W ￿ L;F(￿i));
where C(L;￿i;Pi) is the certainty equivalence for an agent with loss L, risk aversion
￿i, probability Pi, and Fi = 0;8 that is, for an assured wealth of at least C(L;￿i;Pi),
the agent is willing to relinquish the higher expected returns of a risky world. Let
there also be a loading factor ￿ in the insurance, so that the insurance yields Z ￿￿ in
both states.9 The agent will buy the insurance if the wealth, assured from insurance,
is higher than the certainty equivalence, C(L;￿i;Pi) < Z ￿ ￿.
At a given level of risk, the certainty equivalence is lower for an agent with a high
degree of risk aversion, than for a peer with lower aversion, as follows directly from the
de￿nition of risk aversion. At di⁄erent levels of risk, but with the same degree of risk
aversion, the agent with the highest risk has the lowest certainty equivalent; as can be








Hence, for the same level of risk, more risk-averse agents have a higher demand
for insurance than less risk-averse agents. However, agents with higher risk aversion
engage in more prevention and will, in e⁄ect, face a lower risk, which reduces their
demand for insurance.
Lemma 1 Suppose there are two types of agents; where prudent agents are more risk
averse than reckless agents, ￿R > ￿P, then for a given di⁄erence in risk aversion,
￿R ￿ ￿P = c, it follows that:
8Note that ~ C(L;￿i;Pi) is de￿ned at the current level of prevention and C(L;￿i;Pi) is de￿ned at
no prevention, and therefore C(L;￿i;Pi) < ~ C(L;￿i;Pi).
9The loading factor is interpreted as ￿xed administration costs in the insurance, e.g. the oral
examination, but there may also be loading due to slack in the organization or even mark-up. Another
explanation of perceived loading from the agents￿perspective can be systematic over-con￿dence toward
dental risks; that is, agents underestimate their dental risks in a systematic way.
9i. (Advantageous selection) if the di⁄erence in the probability of ending up in the good
state is su¢ ciently small and there is a su¢ ciently large, but not too large, loading
factor, only prudent agents will buy the insurance, i.e. C(L;￿P;PP) < Z ￿ ￿ <
C(L;￿R;PR);
ii. (Adverse selection) if the di⁄erence in the probability of ending up in the good state
is su¢ ciently large and there is an adequate, possibly in￿nitely small, loading factor,
only reckless agents buy the insurance, i.e. C(L;￿R;PR) < Z ￿ ￿ < C(L;￿P;PP).
Proof. From the de￿nition of risk aversion, it follows that the certainty equivalence
is decreasing with risk aversion, and from equation (4), it follows that the certainty
equivalence is increasing with the probability of ending up in the good state. So, for a
given di⁄erence in risk aversion ￿R￿￿P = c, there exists a d such that C(L;￿P;PP) <
C(L;￿R;PR) for Pp ￿ PR < d, and C(L;￿R;PR) < C(L;￿P;PP) for Pp ￿ PR > d.
i. Since PR < ￿, it follows that ZR < Z where ZR = PRW +(1￿PR)(W ￿L). Given
that reckless agents have at least some risk aversion, it follows from the de￿nition of risk
aversion that the certainty equivalence of reckless agents is lower than their expected
wealth, i.e. C(L;￿R;PR) < ZR. Hence, for Pp ￿ PR < d, there exists a loading factor
￿ such that C(L;￿P;PP) < Z ￿ ￿ < C(L;￿R;PR).
ii. Since PP > ￿, it follows that Z < ZP and C(L;￿P;PP) < ZP (analogously to
i). Hence, for Pp ￿ PR > d and C(L;￿P;PP) < Z, there exists a loading factor ￿ such
that C(L;￿R;PR) < Z ￿ ￿ < C(L;￿P;PP). Also, if Pp ￿ PR > d and Z < C(L;￿P),
there exists a loading factor ￿ such that C(L;￿R;PR) < Z ￿￿ < C(L;￿P;PP), though
this factor may be in￿nitely small.
There are four more potential cases not covered in the proposition. These cases
are not interesting, since they do not involve a separation between di⁄erent types of
agents; either all or no agents purchase the insurance.10
The case with advantageous selection is described in ￿gure 1, where there are only
two types of agents; the prudent and the reckless. They di⁄er with respect to risk
aversion and the level of risk they face. Here, prudent and reckless agents have the
10All agents will buy insurance when C(L;￿P;PP) < C(L;￿R;PR) < Z￿￿, or when C(L;￿R;PR) <
C(L;￿P;PP) < Z ￿ ￿. No agent buys insurance if Z ￿ ￿ < C(L;￿P;PP) < C(L;￿R;PR) or if
Z ￿ ￿ < C(L;￿R;PR) < C(L;￿P;PP).
10same utility level both in the good and the bad state. The concave segment AB, i.e.
U, is the utility function of a risk-averse prudent agent. For expositional simplicity,
reckless agents are assumed to be risk neutral, so that the linear segment AB, i.e. V ,
is their utility function. The di⁄erence in risk is su¢ ciently small, given the di⁄erence
in risk aversion, for prudent agents to have a lower certainty equivalence than reckless
agents, CP < CR. The certainty equivalence of prudent agents is also smaller than
the income assured with insurance, CP < Z ￿￿, so the insurance is worth purchasing,
UI > UNI. For the reckless, on the other hand, the insurance is not worth its price,
V I < V NI, as their certainty equivalence is larger than the assured insurance income,
Z ￿ ￿ < CR. The loading factor is crucial for obtaining a separation, because a
reckless agent will always accept an actuarially fair premium in an insurance market
with asymmetric information.
[Figure 1 about here]
The insurance selection e⁄ect may be altered for larger di⁄erences in risk. In ￿gure
2, there is a larger dispersion in probability, as compared to ￿gure 1, which generates
adverse, instead of advantageous, selection, given an adequate loading factor. Due to
the larger dispersion in probability, the certainty equivalence of prudent agents is larger
than for reckless peers, and even larger than the assured insurance income, Z￿￿ < CP.
Prudent agents will therefore not ￿nd the insurance worth buying, UI < UNI. The
certainty equivalence of reckless agents, on the other hand, is lower than the insurance
income, CR < Z ￿ ￿, and they will therefore purchase the insurance, V I > V NI.
[Figure 2 about here]
For a given di⁄erence in risk aversion, the di⁄erence in risk is not exogenous, but
depends on how e⁄ective preventive activities are in reducing the probability of loss.











1(￿ + W;F) ￿ U0
1(￿ + W ￿ L;F)]
SOC
< 0: (5)
This comes from two sources. First, a more e⁄ective prevention has a direct positive
e⁄ect. Second, with more e⁄ective prevention agents with higher risk aversion will
11increase their preventive e⁄ort more, as they have more to gain. Hence, if prevention
were totally ine⁄ective, there would be no di⁄erences in risk across agents. This means
that disparities in prevention would not a⁄ect the probability of ending up in the good
state, P 0(F) = 0, and that it would be optimal to not perform any prevention as it
would only incur a utility cost, F 0(￿) = 0.
Proposition 1 For any given di⁄erence in risk aversion between prudent and reckless
agents, ￿R ￿ ￿P = c, it follows that:
i. (Advantageous selection) if prevention is e⁄ective, but not too e⁄ective, in increasing
the probability of ending up in the good state, there exists a loading factor such that
only prudent agents will purchase the insurance, i.e. C(L;￿P) < Z ￿ ￿ < C(L;￿R);
ii. (Adverse selection) if prevention is su¢ ciently e⁄ective in increasing the probability
of ending up in the good state, there exists a loading factor such that only reckless
agents will purchase the insurance, i.e. C(L;￿R) < Z ￿ ￿ < C(L;￿P).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and equation (5)
The general conclusion will essentially hold, even if there are exogenous di⁄erences
in risk. The exact implication of the exogenous factor will, however, depend on how it
is allocated across agents, see Appendix A.2.
So far the analysis is dealing with selection within a given risk class. Now suppose
that the insurer has some discriminatory power across risks and can allocate individuals
into a high-risk and a low-risk class, and o⁄er them separate insurance contracts.
Within each risk class there is still heterogeneity in risk, so there are agents within each
risk class who are relatively prudent and relatively reckless, i.e. ￿i
P;￿i
R for i = L;H. As
all variation in risk is driven by di⁄erences in precautionary activities, it follows that
agents in the low-risk class have invested more in prevention than have their friends
in the high risk class. The assumption that marginal productivity of prevention is
decreasing, P 00(F) < 0, therefore implies that prevention is more e⁄ective in the high
risk class than in the low. From proposition 1 a corollary therefore follows.
Corollary 1 Let there be two risk classes￿ low and high￿ with heterogeneity in risk
within each risk class. Then, given (a) any di⁄erence in risk aversion within the low-




P = c, and given that (b) prevention
12is e⁄ective, but not too e⁄ective, in the low-risk class, C(L;￿L
P) < C(L;￿L
R), and that
(c) prevention is su¢ ciently e⁄ective in the high-risk class, C(L;￿H
R) < C(L;￿H
P ),
there exists a loading factor, ￿, such that there is;
(i) advantageous selection in the low-risk class and,
(ii) adverse selection in the high-risk class.
Proof. Follows from proposition 1, equation (2) and decreasing marginal productivity
of prevention, P 00(F) < 0.
The corollary tells us that advantageous selection is more likely in the low risk class
than the high, while the opposite applies for adverse selection. Also, if there is both
adverse and advantageous selection in the insurance scheme, the latter would be found
within the low risk class.
4 Data and estimations
4.1 Data
Data comes from an administrative database over dental consumption. The sample
consists of risk-classi￿ed dental patients aged 22 or older registered with the National
Dental Service in V￿rmland for the period 1996 to 1999, and who had at least one
dental visit in 1999. These patients had the opportunity to purchase a contract in
1999. The insurance was mainly brought to the patients￿attention by their dentist, so
patients without a visit in 1999 may not have taken any active decision on whether to
insure and are therefore excluded from the analysis. Patients also need to have been
registered with the National Dental Service from 1996, so that their dental care can be
tracked through 1996 to 1998.
[Table 2 about here]
Patients are mainly clustered in the low and middle risk classes, and the share of
policyholders varies across risk classes, see table 2. None of the policyholders belong
to any of the three top risk classes, 14 to 16, and they are therefore excluded from the
analysis. The potential sample consists of 49 617 patients, but around 40 percent were
13not given an o⁄er to buy dental insurance.11 The ￿nal sample therefore consists of 29
544 patients who were directly o⁄ered to subscribe to dental care, 6 888￿ 23 percent￿
of whom signed up for a contract.
Private information on dental risk is proxied with previous dental costs. This
variable includes all dental costs from the years 1996 to 1998. Table 2 shows that
previous costs rise with higher risk classes and that there is a large variability within
each risk class. Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in table B.1 in
Appendix B.
4.2 Econometric model
An agent will purchase insurance if the utility from being insured exceeds the expected
utility from being uninsured, UI > UNI. To study if adverse selection is a problem for
the dental insurance in V￿rmland, the model of insurance choice can be characterized
as a reduced-form random utility model
Prob(yi = 1) = Prob(U
I > U
NI) = Prob(ui > ￿￿
0Ii); (6)
where yi = 1 if the agent purchases the insurance. I = (X;P) is the information on
dental risk, where X is the public information on which the insurer prices the insurance
contracts, and P is private information on risk available to the agent only. The model of
insurance choice gives clear reduced-form predictions. In the case of adverse selection,
agents with high private dental risk, P, conditional on the insurer￿ s information, X,
will buy insurance. With advantageous selection, it is agents with low dental risk, P,
conditional on X, who purchase insurance coverage.
Demand for insurance is a⁄ected by risk aversion. Now, the mechanism generating
advantageous selection is the negative correlation between risk aversion and dental risk,
and by controlling for risk aversion, only behavior consistent with adverse selection
will be observable, not whether this is balanced out with systematic di⁄erences in risk
11This is either directly noted by the dentist, or indicated by patients having no risk classi￿cation,
or the risk assessment being made before 1998. Patients without, or without a valid up-to-date, risk
classi￿cation are regarded as not having had the opportunity to buy insurance, since they do not know
how a potential contract would be priced.
14aversion. A problem with adding variables to control for heterogeneity is therefore
that they may be related to risk aversion. Variables like gender and age are therefore
problematic, since they have a reported relation with risk aversion, see Barsky, Justin,
Kimball and Shapiro (1997), and Guiso and Paiella (2003).
There are also other reasons why age and gender are problematic; they may pick
up private information not captured by the risk-classi￿cation system. The empirical
strategy is to analyze the e⁄ect of private information, P, conditional on public infor-
mation, X, in the decision to buy insurance. Adding age and gender to the analysis
would, in an econometric sense, be the same as conditioning on more information than
contained in X. Unless P is unrelated to age and gender, the estimated e⁄ect of P
would be biased downwards, as these variables will pick up e⁄ects generated by asym-
metric information. In fact, table B.2 in Appendix B shows that age and gender is
related to past dental costs after controlling for the risk classes. Age and gender is
therefore not included in the analysis.
The propensity to purchase insurance varies across dental clinics and dentists, in-
dicating that the attitudes of dentists in￿ uence the decision to insure dental risks.
Certain clinics may try to in￿ uence pro￿table patients to sign up. Note that dentists
do not have any direct economic interest in cream skimming as they are paid a ￿xed
salary. It is possible that, for compassionate reasons, individual dentists try to in￿ uence
patients with particularly high risks. Either way, it is important to take account of
the e⁄ect from individual clinics and dentists. To this end, a dummy variable Dc for
each clinic c=2,3,...,43 is used. The di⁄erences in attitudes across individual dentists
are captured through each Dentist￿ s share of patients having insurance.
To capture the risk assessed by the National Dental Service, X, a dummy variable
Dr is included for each risk class r=2,3,...,13. The e⁄ect of private risk, P, is measured
by past dental cost, and to observe if the e⁄ect of asymmetric information is stable
across di⁄erent levels of risk, an interaction variable Dg ￿costi for class g=1,2,...,13. is
used
￿






￿g(Dg ￿ costi) +
C X
c=1
Dc + ￿dDent:sharei: (7)
Another issue is whether the sample is random. Not all patients were directly o⁄ered
to subscribe to dental care by their dentist, which raises the question of whether the
15sample may be non-random due to sample selection. Suppose dentists would o⁄er
the insurance selectively to pro￿table patients, or selectively to high-risk patients.
This would then lead to biased estimates in equation (6), if the selected patients are
more inclined to purchase the insurance, than those not selected. To take account of
potential sample selection bias a bivariate probit model is estimated, as suggested by
Greene (1997)
Prob(y1i = 1) = Prob(ui > ￿￿
0Ii); (8)
Prob(y2i = 1) = Prob(vi > ￿￿
0Zi):
The ￿rst line is the random utility model from equation (6) and the second line
is a sample selection equation where y1 is observed only if y2 = 1. The sample selec-
tion problem implies that the error terms in the two lines of equation (8) is related,
￿ = cov(u;v) 6= 0. By estimating the insurance choice and sample selection equations
as a bivariate system allowing for ui and vi to be bivariate normal distributed with a
covariance ￿ and independent of I, unbiased estimates of the insurance choice is ob-
tained. In order to identify ￿ there has to be an exclusionary restriction in the selection
equation; that is, an instrument that is a good predictor of y2i but is independent of
the error in the insurance choice equation E(ujI;Z) = E(ujI) (Heckman, Lalonde and
Smith, 1999 p. 1957). The observation that the share of patients that were given an
o⁄er varies across dentists is used as an exclusionary restriction. As patients with the
National Dental Service essentially are allocated randomly to their dentist, and with
few patients changing dentist unless they move, any variation in the share of o⁄ers
across dentists must re￿ ect di⁄erences in attitudes and not characteristics of patients.
Hence, the dentist￿ s Share of o⁄ers would not have any direct e⁄ect on the insurance
purchase, making it a valid instrument. Other covariates used in the sample selection
equation are age, gender, dental cost and dummy variables for each clinic.
4.3 Estimations
The results di⁄er across risk classes. In low-risk classes, past dental costs are higher
for patients not purchasing insurance. The pattern for high-risk classes is the opposite;
insurance purchasers have a higher past dental cost. For intermediate risk classes, the
16di⁄erence in cost is small and the pattern is unclear. Thus, there is evidence of both
adverse and advantageous selection in the sample, as displayed in ￿gure 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
Estimates of the insurance choice are reported in table 3. In the simplest model,
only dummy variables for the risk classes and a joint cost variable are used to explain
insurance choice. The coe¢ cient for the cost variable is positive and signi￿cant, in-
dicating adverse selection on the aggregate level. Agents with higher dental costs, in
the past, are more likely to purchase dental insurance. When the dentist￿ s share of
policyholders and a ￿xed e⁄ects for each clinic are added to the analysis, dental cost
does not a⁄ect the probability of purchasing insurance. This ￿nding, that the cost
variable is insigni￿cant when the in￿ uence of dentists and clinics is taken into account,
may be interpreted as if some dentists actively in￿ uence agents with high risk, relative
to peers in the same risk class, to buy insurance. Alternatively, there may be patient
heterogeneity across clinics not captured by the risk classi￿cation.
[Table 3 about here]
When interaction terms are allowed the cost coe¢ cient is negative and signi￿cant
for the ￿ve lowest risk classes, insigni￿cant for risk classes 6 and 7, and then positive
and signi￿cant for risk classes 8 to 12. In risk class 13, however, the coe¢ cient is
negative but insigni￿cant. For agents in the lowest risk classes, the probability of
purchasing insurance increases with lower dental costs. For the highest risk classes, the
probability of subscribing to dental care increases with the dental costs. Risk class 13
does not ￿t into the rest of the pattern, but can be explained by the fact that this risk
class consists of 332 patients, only 9 of whom have chosen to insure their dental risks.
Chance thus has a larger scope.
When the in￿ uence of dentists and clinics again is added to the analysis, the results
are slightly changed. The cost coe¢ cients are now negative and signi￿cant for classes
1 to 7, and positive and at least marginally signi￿cant for risk classes 8 to 12. The
estimated e⁄ect of adverse selection diminishes somewhat, and the e⁄ect of advanta-
geous selection increases, when the in￿ uence of clinics and dentists is accounted for. It
17seems as if dentists strengthen the adverse selection e⁄ect by in￿ uencing patients with
a relatively high risk to purchase insurance.
The marginal e⁄ects show a stable and systematic pattern, from negative to positive.
For low-risk classes, the results are consistent with advantageous selection. For the
highest risk classes, on the other hand, the results are consistent with adverse selection.
[Table 4 about here]
To get an impression of the economic signi￿cance of the estimated e⁄ects in model
4, the probability of buying insurance is ￿rst evaluated at the mean cost for each risk
class, and then compared to the probability when dental cost is doubled, see table 4.12
For risk class 2, the probability of purchasing the insurance is reduced by more than a
third￿ from 0.40 to 0.25￿ when dental cost is doubled from its mean value, while for
risk group 11, the probability of insurance purchase is increased with 51 percent￿ from
0.025 to 0.037.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 reports the bivariate probit estimates, when controlling for sample selection
bias. In both models, the error covariance, ￿, indicates that sample selection may be
a problem, i.e. ￿ = 0 is rejected. In model 5, the insurance decision is explained with
an intercept term and a slope for each risk class, but no controls for dentist or clinic
e⁄ects. The results are similar to model 3, but for some of the high-risk classes the
adverse selection e⁄ect no longer reach signi￿cance. When the in￿ uence of dentists and
clinics are added (model 6), the pattern remains almost unchanged.
Correcting for sample selection has little impact on the results. The pattern with
advantageous selection in low risk classes and adverse selection in high risk classes is
still clear, though the evidence for adverse selection becomes slightly weaker.
5 Discussion
In the face of the mixed empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets,
extended mechanisms for selection are called for. de Meza and Webb (2001) present
12For each risk class, the mean value of dental cost is roughly the same as the standard deviation.
18an argument reversing the conclusion that low risks are under-insured in competitive
insurance markets with asymmetric information. Advantageous selection is generated
by di⁄erences in risk aversion and a causal relation between risk aversion and risk.
The theoretical model presented here extended the analysis by showing that the
more (less) e⁄ective is prevention, the higher is the likelihood of adverse (advanta-
geous) selection. The analysis was cast in a setting mimicking the dental insurance in
V￿rmland, Sweden.
The overall evidence from the dental insurance natural experiment in V￿rmland
suggests that adverse selection may not be a problem at the aggregate level. The
estimated adverse selection is concentrated to high risk classes. In lower risk classes,
however, there is evidence consistent with advantageous selection. Here, the probability
of purchasing dental coverage is increasing with lower dental risk, measured as past
dental care consumption. This latter evidence is consistent with ￿ndings of Cawley
and Philipson (1999) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2003).
The interesting feature with the present results, though, is the behavioral di⁄erences
across the sample. The pattern can be contained within the theoretical model, where
heterogeneity in risk was generated only through di⁄erences in risk aversion. Low risk
classes would therefore contain agents with a high degree of risk aversion, whereas
high risk classes have less risk averse agents. With a lower preventive e⁄ort in high
risk classes and a decreasing marginal productivity of prevention, the e⁄ectiveness
of prevention would be greater in high risk classes. This implies a higher likelihood
of adverse selection in high, than in low, risk classes, as follows from corollary 1.
Correspondingly, advantageous selection would be more probable in low risk classes
than in high.
In practice, however, dental status and dental risk are also in￿ uenced by genetic
factors, e.g. the quality of saliva. Preventive activities are more e⁄ective for agents
who are genetically predisposed to caries, as they have more to gain from prevention.
The average genetic predisposition to caries would also be worse in high-risk than in
low-risk classes, so, on average, the e⁄ectiveness of prevention would thus be further
reinforced in high-risk classes. This implies that the prediction of adverse selection in
high-risk classes, and advantageous selection in low risk classes, is strengthened when
19genetic factors are taken into account.
Entities such as risk aversion and utility functions cannot be explicitly observed in
the data, and therefore it is not possible to directly test the theoretical model. However,
the empirical results show evidence of advantageous selection in low risk classes, and
adverse selection in high risk classes. These ￿ndings can still be reconciled with the
predictions of the theoretical framework. The dual selection may explain the limited
empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets, as the two e⁄ects balance
out on the aggregate level.
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26Tables
Table 1: Regression of Dental Costs 1999-2001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef t-value Coef t-value Coef t-value
Cost 99-01
Cons. 2042 96.8 979 8.66 751 6.78
Cost 96-98 0.360 68.8 0.217 39.9
D gr2 142 1.02 124 0.91
D gr3 321 2.38 288 2.18
D gr4 581 4.74 488 4.07
D gr5 966 7.95 804 6.76
D gr6 1373 11.4 1143 9.68
D gr7 1941 16.2 1583 13.5
D gr8 2446 20.7 1983 17.0
D gr9 3154 26.1 2565 21.5
D gr10 3500 28.2 2798 22.8
D gr11 3978 31.0 3216 25.3
D gr12 4717 32.8 3845 27.0
D gr13 5222 30.3 4166 24.4
D gr14 5074 21.2 4018 17.0
D gr15 4317 10.6 3331 8.32
D gr16 927 1.11 -11.2 -0.01
N 36241 36241 36241
Adj R2 0.116 0.173 0.208
Note: The sample consists of patient who did not purchase a dental insur-
ance contract during the period 1996 to 2001.
27Table 2: Insurance Choice and Dental Cost 1996-1998 by Risk Class
Risk class Number of observations Av. Cost Stdv. Min Max
Insurance No ins.
All 29544 6888 22656 2936 2997 0 88451
1 370 139 231 1023 931 0 6826
2 976 439 537 1090 753 0 6446
3 1245 509 736 1213 788 0 6611
4 2718 959 1759 1484 1176 0 19259
5 3380 1055 2325 1834 2011 0 88451
6 3772 1089 2683 2248 1957 0 46902
7 4206 1042 3164 2820 2339 0 36785
8 4879 895 3984 3405 2938 0 66675
9 3300 433 2867 4089 3445 0 42975
10 2178 218 1960 4585 4374 0 60597
11 1459 63 1396 4836 3933 0 44779
12 729 38 691 5359 3933 0 26713
13 332 9 323 6458 4623 0 29377
28Table 3: Probit Estimates of the Insurance Choice
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Insurance
Cons. -0.32 0.000 -1.26 0.000 -0.12 0.266 -1.04 0.000
D gr2 0.190 0.014 0.130 0.120 0.337 0.008 0.313 0.025
D gr3 0.085 0.261 0.035 0.668 0.118 0.343 0.069 0.608
D gr4 -0.064 0.364 -0.087 0.258 -0.117 0.295 -0.126 0.301
D gr5 -0.179 0.011 -0.192 0.011 -0.274 0.013 -0.261 0.031
D gr6 -0.250 0.000 -0.293 0.000 -0.407 0.000 -0.438 0.000
D gr7 -0.378 0.000 -0.431 0.000 -0.546 0.000 -0.585 0.000
D gr8 -0.604 0.000 -0.677 0.000 -0.872 0.000 -0.938 0.000
D gr9 -0.83 0.000 -0.92 0.000 -1.11 0.000 -1.18 0.000
D gr10 -0.99 0.000 -1.09 0.000 -1.26 0.000 -1.36 0.000
D gr11 -1.43 0.000 -1.55 0.000 -1.78 0.000 -1.97 0.000
D gr12 -1.34 0.000 -1.48 0.000 -1.72 0.000 -1.86 0.000
D gr13 -1.65 0.000 -1.81 0.000 -1.74 0.000 -1.91 0.000
Cost 7.48E-06 0.020 -2.02E-06 0.572
Cost gr1 -2.04E-04 0.015 -2.07E-04 0.023
Cost gr2 -3.25E-04 0.000 -3.66E-04 0.000
Cost gr3 -1.94E-04 0.000 -2.02E-04 0.000
Cost gr4 -9.95E-05 0.000 -1.15E-04 0.000
Cost gr5 -5.58E-05 0.001 -7.61E-05 0.000
Cost gr6 -1.55E-05 0.156 -2.74E-05 0.017
Cost gr7 -6.91E-06 0.452 -1.88E-05 0.057
Cost gr8 2.45E-05 0.000 1.52E-05 0.036
Cost gr9 2.51E-05 0.001 1.31E-05 0.106
Cost gr10 1.92E-05 0.009 1.23E-05 0.113
Cost gr11 3.43E-05 0.004 3.79E-05 0.004
Cost gr12 3.67E-05 0.033 2.77E-05 0.129
Cost gr13 -1.16E-05 0.736 -1.94E-05 0.652
Dent. Share 3.31 0.000 3.33 0.000
FE clinics No Yes No Yes
N 29544 29544 29544 29544
Log L -15007 -12758 -14943 -12696
LRI 0.065 0.205 0.069 0.209
29Table 4: Impact of the Selection E⁄ects
Risk class Prob. at mean Prob at 2*mean Change Perc. Change
1 0.345 0.270 -0.075 -21.5
2 0.396 0.260 -0.142 -36.0
3 0.368 0.282 -0.087 -24.2
4 0.324 0.270 -0.058 -18.3
5 0.286 0.240 -0.045 -16.1
6 0.253 0.232 -0.019 -7.7
7 0.209 0.193 -0.015 -7.2
8 0.146 0.157 0.012 8.4
9 0.096 0.106 0.009 9.9
10 0.069 0.077 0.008 11.3
11 0.024 0.036 0.013 51.4
12 0.028 0.041 0.011 38.9
13 0.014 0.010 -0.004 -28.0
Note: The probability are calculated using the estimates in model 4, table 3, and evalu-
ated (i) at the mean cost and (ii) at two times the mean cost in each risk class. Change
indicate the change in probability as the mean cost is doubled
30Table 5: Bivariate Probit Estimates of the Insurance Choice
Model 5 Model 6
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Insurance Cons. 0.30 0.000 -0.98 0.000
D gr2 0.247 0.013 0.305 0.020
D gr3 0.090 0.349 0.065 0.611
D gr4 -0.091 0.290 -0.120 0.295
D gr5 -0.200 0.020 -0.244 0.032
D gr6 -0.287 0.001 -0.405 0.000
D gr7 -0.365 0.000 -0.537 0.000
D gr8 -0.574 0.000 -0.854 0.000
D gr9 -0.72 0.000 -1.08 0.000
D gr10 -0.80 0.000 -1.23 0.000
D gr11 -1.16 0.000 -1.79 0.000
D gr12 -1.08 0.000 -1.68 0.000
D gr13 -1.04 0.000 -1.71 0.000
Cost gr1 -1.42E-04 0.025 -1.86E-04 0.031
Cost gr2 -2.54E-04 0.000 -3.47E-04 0.000
Cost gr3 -1.42E-04 0.000 -1.83E-04 0.000
Cost gr4 -6.96E-05 0.000 -1.04E-04 0.000
Cost gr5 -4.09E-05 0.002 -6.90E-05 0.000
Cost gr6 -9.82E-06 0.196 -2.37E-05 0.028
Cost gr7 -7.45E-06 0.280 -1.60E-05 0.085
Cost gr8 1.30E-05 0.011 1.48E-05 0.030
Cost gr9 1.36E-05 0.015 1.29E-05 0.091
Cost gr10 1.03E-05 0.071 1.17E-05 0.111
Cost gr11 2.34E-05 0.007 3.49E-05 0.005
Cost gr12 1.75E-05 0.154 2.40E-05 0.163
Cost gr13 -2.93E-05 0.332 -2.29E-05 0.581
Dent. Share 2.92 0.000
FE clinics No Yes
O⁄er Cons. -1.018 0.000 -1.000 0.000
Age 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004
Age2 -1.33E-04 0.000 -1.27E-04 0.000
Gender 7.41E-03 0.484 1.61E-02 0.177
Cost -1.49E-06 0.464 -1.88E-06 0.363
Share of o⁄ers 2.09 0.000 2.22 0.000
FE clinics Yes Yes
N 49617 49617
N cens. 20073 20073
N uncens. 29544 29544
Log L -43633 -42135
Rho -0.862 0.000 -0.476 0.000
31Appendix A
A.1 A general formulation of the model
In a more general formulation of the model in section 3, prevention enters the agents￿
utility function both in terms of monetary cost and direct disutility, U(W ￿F;F) where
U0
1 > 0, U00
11 < 0, U0
2 < 0, U00
22 < 0. Further, the direct disutility from prevention is
assumed to be a⁄ected by the level of income, UFW 6= 0. With probability 1 ￿ P(F),
the agents su⁄ers a monetary loss L, and the expected utility is
EU = P(F)U(W ￿ F;F) + [1 ￿ P(F)]U(W ￿ F ￿ L;F) (A.9)
F.O.C. w.r.t. F;
P
0(F)[U(W ￿ F;F) ￿ U(W ￿ F ￿ L;F)] (A.10)
+P(F)[U
0





2(W ￿ F;F) ￿ U
0
2(W ￿ F ￿ L;F)]
￿U
0
1(W ￿ F ￿ L;F)
+U
0
2(W ￿ F ￿ L;F)
S.O.C
P
00(F)[U(W ￿ F;F) ￿ U(W ￿ F ￿ L;F)] (A.11)
+P(F)U
00
11(W ￿ F;F) + [1 ￿ P(F)]U
00
11(W ￿ F ￿ L;F)
+P(F)U
00
22(W ￿ F;F) + [1 ￿ P(F)]U
00










2(W ￿ F;F) ￿ U
0
2(W ￿ F ￿ L;F)]
￿2P(F)U
00
12(W ￿ F;F) ￿ 2[1 ￿ P(F)]U
00
12(W ￿ F ￿ L;F):
The ￿rst, second and third lines are negative. They capture the trade-o⁄ between a
higher probability for the good state and the utility cost of prevention in both states.
The fourth line is positive and captures the fact that the monetary cost of prevention
gives rise to a larger utility reduction in the bad than in the good state, as follows
from the concavity of the utility function. This means that prevention worsens the
32consequences of the bad state, relative to the good state. If U00
12 > 0 (U00
12 < 0), the ￿fth
line is positive (negative); that is, if the direct disutility of prevention is decreasing
(increasing) with income, the utility reduction is larger (smaller) in the bad than in
the good state. The sixth line is positive (negative) if U00
12 < 0 (U00
12 > 0), and captures
the indirect e⁄ect reducing (strengthening) the utility loss in both states. This e⁄ect
follows because the lower net income following from a larger purchase of prevention
(￿rst argument) reduces the direct utility loss of prevention (second argument). In the
same way, a larger direct utility loss following from more extensive prevention (second
argument) reduces the utility loss following from a higher monetary cost of prevention
(￿rst argument).
For the S.O.C to be negative, the positive terms need to be su¢ ciently small; that
is, (i) the monetary cost of prevention needs to constitute a su¢ ciently small part of
the agents￿total budget or the concavity of utility w.r.t. income needs to be su¢ ciently
mild and (iia), if U00
12 > 0 the increased direct disutility of prevention following from
lower income needs to be su¢ ciently small, or (iib) if U00
12 < 0, the indirect utility
increasing e⁄ect needs to be su¢ ciently small. The intuition behind (i) and (iia)
is that a higher level of prevention increases the expected utility as it increases the
probabilityof the good state, but prevention will also cause a larger utility reduction
in the bad than in the good state. Therefore, it is not certain whether the utility
enhancing e⁄ect or the utility reducing e⁄ect dominates.
Risk aversion can be modelled with an individual-speci￿c taste-parameter ￿ being
added to the ￿rst argument of the utility function, assuming constant relative risk
aversion. A higher ￿ implies a lower level of risk aversion. The marginal e⁄ect of
risk aversion on precautionary activities is obtained by di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order









1(￿i + W;Fi) ￿ U0
1(￿i + W ￿ L;Fi)]
￿P(Fi)U00
11(￿i + W;Fi) ￿ [1 ￿ P(Fi)]U00
11(￿i + W ￿ L;Fi)
+P(Fi)U00
12(￿i + W;Fi) + [1 ￿ P(F)]U00




The result that a higher degree of risk aversion results in more extensive prevention
may still hold under less restrictive assumptions; that is, when (i) preventive activities
have a monetary cost and (ii) U00
12 6= 0, equation (A.12) may still be negative if the
second-order condition is negative and the second term is negative. The ￿rst line in
33the second term is negative. The second line is positive and must be su¢ ciently small.
The third line is negative if U00
12 < 0, and positive if U00
12 > 0. In the latter case, the
cross derivative must be su¢ ciently small.
A.2 Exogenous di⁄erences in risk
In section 3, the di⁄erences in the probability of loss are purely generated through
di⁄erences in the level of prevention. Now, suppose that there is an exogenous source
in￿ uencing the probability of loss, e.g. a genetic factor. Let G be the exogenous factor,
where higher levels of G imply a higher probability of avoiding loss, P 0
2(F;G) > 0. The
impact of the genetic factor on the theoretical results depends on how G is distributed
across types. For simplicity, let there be only two levels of G, GH > GL, and only two
agents, a reckless and a prudent one. Furthermore, the following notational conventions
are used C(L;￿j;P(F(￿j);Gi)) = Cj(Gi) and P(F(￿j);Gi) = P(￿j;Gi) for i = L;H.
Consider ￿rst the case where, for some exogenous reason, e.g. better genetics, the
prudent agent has a higher probability of avoiding loss than the reckless agent. So even
if prevention is completely ine⁄ective P(￿P;GH) > P(￿R;GL), and if the exogenous
in￿ uence is su¢ ciently mild, we may have that
CP(GH) < CR(GL): (A.13)
With an adequate loading factor, only the prudent agent buys insurance. In other
words, there may be an advantageous selection. As prevention becomes more e⁄ective
the di⁄erence in probability￿ between the prudent and the reckless agent￿ will increase
and eventually
CR(GL) < CP(GH): (A.14)
Given an adequate loading factor, only the reckless agent will buy insurance, and there
will be adverse selection. If the exogenous in￿ uence is su¢ ciently large, the di⁄erence in
probability may generate adverse selection, even if prevention is completely ine¢ cient.
The second case to consider is that when the reckless agent is exogenously allocated
with a higher probability of avoiding loss. Hence, if prevention is completely ine⁄ective,
then P(￿P;GL) < P(￿R;GH), and
CP(GL) < CR(GH): (A.15)
34With an adequate loading factor, only the prudent agent purchases insurance. Since
he also has a lower probability of avoiding loss, this means adverse selection. When
prevention becomes more e⁄ective P(￿P;GH) > P(￿R;GL), while equation (A.15) still
holds. Hence, still only the prudent agent will purchase insurance, but since he has a
higher probability of avoiding loss, there will now be advantageous selection given an
adequate loading factor. As prevention becomes even more e⁄ective, the di⁄erence in
probability will increase and eventually
CR(GH) < CP(GL): (A.16)
Now, only the reckless agent purchases insurance, given an adequate loading factor,
and since he has a lower probability of avoiding loss, this implies adverse selection.
The general results from section 3 will still hold when there is an exogenous source
to risk, i.e. with prevention being highly e⁄ective, adverse selection may exist, while
there may be advantageous selection if prevention is less e⁄ective.
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Stdv. Min Max
Insurance 29544 0.233 0.423 0 1
Dent. Share 29544 0.163 0.138 0 0.621
O⁄er 49617 0.595 0.491 0 1
Age 49617 47.6 16.6 22 98
Gender 49617 0.494 0.500 0 1
Cost 49617 2990 3100 0 88451
Share of o⁄ers 49617 0.592 0.183 0 1





D gr2 19.8 0.12
D gr3 90.6 0.56
D gr4 255 1.69
D gr5 549 3.65
D gr6 870 5.79
D gr7 1336 8.86
D gr8 1840 12.16
D gr9 2499 16.17
D gr10 2964 18.63
D gr11 3219 19.51
D gr12 3755 20.86
D gr3 4851 22.97
Age 87.5 13.78
Age2 -0.74 -12.20
Gender -164 -5.16
N 29466
R2 0.177
Adj R2 0.177
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